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PUBLIC WELFARE: UTILIZATION, CHANGE, APPROPRIATIONS, SERVICE
John E. Tropman
The University of Michigan
School of Social Work
Introduction
During the decade of the 1960's there was continually
increasing interest in the programs of public welfare. This
interest sprang from several sources. Citizens, always worried
about welfare expenditures, developed resurgent concern. Recipi-
ents, long a quiet group, became more active, forming the National
Welfare Rights Organization. And then there was the rediscovery
of poverty as a social problem, and a realization that very many
Americans were poor, many more than anyone had somehow realized.
The general interest in poverty and the measures used to
relieve it had an effect on the academic community, generating some
sustained and critical attention to public welfare by people other
than those identifiid with the social work profession for the first
time in many years. Of particular interest were the rates of welfare
utilization and the amount of money the client on welfare received.
The purpose of this paper is to review literature in the area of
welfare utilization analysis, to present some new data in the area,
and to present a hypothetical model which accounts for some of the
differences in the data, and provides an integration of the mechanism
used by welfare agencies to deal with the multiple contingency
situation they face.
Four Studies
2
In an early report, Dawson and Robinson reviewed the public
assistance programs within the context of state politics, and looked
at welfare expenditures in relationship to socio-economic factors,
"need", and some "political correlates." They found that social
factors (urbanization, industrialization, foreign born, per capita
income) were related positively to welfare expenditures. Using three
measures of "need" (infant mortality, children without both parents,
and youths not finishing schools), they found that "the extensiveness
of welfare programs varies inversely with objective need."3
Gordon, looking at New York City, came to the conclusion that
while there was much umet need in the city "... the largest source
of the increase in welfare stemed from the increase in real grant
levels,.." 4 This conclusion is based, however, upon a single city,
and should be carefully considered as to its applicability to the
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nation as a whole. It represents, further, the public fear of
conservatives, as well as perhaps the secret concern of liberals,
about the effects of benefits which become "too adequate."
5
Collins, in an extensive study, covers all the welfare programs.
At some points, hcr results are different from those of Dawson and
Robinson. Specifically, for the ADC program, she finds that per
capita income has negative relationships to the per capita ADC
expenditures, in contradistinction to the positive relationships
found by Dawson and Robinson6 on total welfare expenditure (although
Collins continues to get negative results with four federally
aided programs combined). Further, using a somewhat different
measure of "need" (per cent of children living with mother only, 1960),
Collins finds assistance positively related to need as opposed to
Dawson and Robinson's negative relation.7
Perhaps the most complicated study is the one by Kasper. Look-
ing only at General Assistance Rates, he attempts to develop a pre-
dictive model using residual unemployment ("the unemployment rate
during the recent past"). These rather than the "differences in the
average levels of payment in the states seem to be the major explana-
tion of interstate variation in the proportion of the states'
population receiving General Assistance."
8
Looked at as a group, the studies are enlightening as well as
puzzling. It is not surprising that beginning studies in a new area
produce some contradictions. And it is not our purpose here to
engage in critique. But there are some deficiencies which are
common to them all, and which deserve consideration.
A primary area in which the current studies lack specificity is
in providing regional controls. On many variables, the influence of
region is well known. In the elfare field, one would not expect
this influence to be any less. Therefore, in the data we present,
four regions -- north central, north east, south, and west are also
presented separately. The rather large differences we found not
only in means but in correlation coefficients suggests this specifi-
city would have been useful.
One other distinction seems necessary as well. Kasper anticipates
it in his comment that "Although it seems there is a more clear-cut
relation between the rates of GAP and the levels of payment in states
which offer little assistance, we make no attempt at an explanation."1 0
The general level of the states' wealth certainly affects both the
amount of need and the capacity of the state to meet need. Further,
there is a "willingness" aspect observed through the degree to which
a state is willing to tax itself to provide for welfare. While we
have as yet no comprehensive measures of states on this variable,
the very least one can do is divide the states into high and low
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per capita income groups, and inspect, within each group, the
interrelations of welfare and social variables. This we have also
done.
A second area in which more discussion is needed lies in assess-
ing the degree to which the program meets "needs." Dawson and
Robinson, for example, ar ued that the program was not responsive to
need as they measured it. 1I Yet prior to this type of analysis one
is required to assess, in a macro-system sense, the degree to which
the program is meeting its mission. Particularly, we need to know
how adequately the program is meeting the "demand" for its service.
In some cases, such as telephone service, there is relatively little
distance between the demand and the supply. In other cases, such as
public welfare, there is a great gap between the potential enrollees
and the actual recipients. The dimensions and meaning of this gap
need to be explored.
Thirdly, the studies generally use a kind of macro-micro analysis
pattern looking at the broadest measures of social structure and
predicting the mean grant level for an assistance program. There is,
of course, nothing in principle wrong with this style of analysis.
In this case, however, the mean grant level, or the recipie rate,
are all variables which are connected to the county office. To
a degree at least, the relationships between the large scale system
variables on the one hand and the average measures of use and payment
on the other are mediated by an organizational level. People can be
switched from one program to another if funding becomes problematic.
At least one decision which administrators face is whether to fund
many people at low levels or fewer people at higher levels. 13
While we cannot now measure the impact of organizational structure
directly, it is important theoretically to understand the interrelated-
ness of utilization, appropriation and, to an extent, service (as
measured by caseload) because of their common organizational locus.
A fourth point worth taking into consideration is that welfare
agencies in each state must and do secure a budget from the state
legislature. Expenditure rates which exhaust this appropriation too
soon may create problems. Kasper mentions this point in passing,
noting t~t "....welfare agencies may be operating under a fixed
budget." This may well introduce a series of constraints into
the management of public assistance which has hitherto been unclear.
In fact, as we will discuss later, it seems quite possible that
the elasticity of the funds available for public welfare is much
less than the elasticity of potential and actual demand.
Finally, the studies perhaps necessarily, miss the critical
variable of change in the public welfare rates. During the sixties,
and especially for the AFDC program, there were significant increments
in the size of the programs. This increased pressure on the program
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was alone sufficient to stimulate much discussion of the applicant
rate, apparently under the assumption that these increments were
"odd." But any study today would have to include a measure of the
increments in the rates, as well as the level of the rates.
The purpose of this research report, then, is to add to the
developing literature some exploration of the rates of public
assistance in the various states in relation to each other, to the
funding of public aid, to change in the number of applicants, and
to the level of services provided under the program. In this case,
service is defined as the number of cases per AFDC worker. In
looking at these rates and their relationship to the societal (or
state) context in which they exist, we shall attempt to take into
account some of the difficulties with the previous studies.
Data and Method
For the fifty states and the District of Columbia a number
of variables developed which were relevant to the public welfare
system. We decided to focus on the AFDC program exclusively for
several reasons. It is, of course, the program within which the
largest average increments have occurred. Also, it is the program
which, over all, is surrounded by the greatest controversy. The
public is relatively willing to support the blind (Aid to the Blind),
the aged (Old Age Assistance), the disabled (Aid to the Permanently
and Totally Disabled). To a lesser degree, the public is willing
to provide short term aid to people who are not covered by any
federal category (General Assistance). Serious difficulty occurs,
however, in the program for Aid to Families with Dependent Children
with overtones of indolence and promiscuity which the public seems
to instantly assert characterize the families. Finally, in a short
treatment, looking at all five programs would have been prohibitive.
Basically the approach presented here is correlational. A
regreT9ion study has been undertaken expanding on the data developed
here.
In line with the comments we made on the other studies, we
have presented results for four regions (North East, North Central,
South, and West). Also, because we believed that the fiscal capacity
of the state was of importance in many ways for the welfare programs,
we divided the states into two groups --Hi h and Low -- on the basis
of per capita income. 1 7 Using the mean per capita inome of $3,200
per year as a point, we created two groups of 25 "rich" and 26 "poor"
states respectively.
Findings
The Poverty Gap
As a first step in looking at welfare structure, we are
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interested in knowing how closely the program comes to meeting
the need for welfare assistance. There is no direct measure of
people in need. However, the 1962 City-County Data Book does report
the percent of families with incomes under $3,000 in 1959. This
figure can be considered to be a population at-risk, and although
the entire number would not be eligible for assistance, many would
be, or could be. 18 Hence, it provides a well-known, uncomplicated
measure of poverty in the state against which the efforts of the
program can be considered. Since the AFDC program is for families,
there is a nice articulation of populations. The relevant data are
presented in Table 1.
Table I About Here
These data are quite striking. For the nation, 23.5 of the families
had incomes under $3000 in 1959. In 1967, there were 2.56 AFDC cases
per 100 families. There is, of course, a discrepancy in the years.
Nonetheless, there is still a significant gap, suggesting a rather
large number of people who are in need, and who Hnstitute a "pressure"
on the public welfare system of a constant sort. It also means, as
we shall see, that one can observe increases of 1007. or more, and still
be at a very low level of adequacy. It appears that our citizenry
has never realized just how far from meeting needs the program was.
People become shocked at large increments in utilization, large from
the perspective of the program, but small in respect to the potential
user.
The results by region and income are interesting as well. It
is immediately clear that there are large differences in the
distribution of poverty throughout the state groups, ranging from
a low of 15.8 in the North Eastern States to a high of 32.9. in
the Southern States. And, by definition, states high in per capita
income have less poverty than those with low per capita income,
16.0% to 30.4%.
The rates of utilization, however, show some interesting
shifts. Despite the fact that high and low per capita income states
have radically different rates of poverty, their rates of assistance
urilization are almost identical. This suggests that, regardless
of benefit levels, poor states are making a relatively greater
effort or are forced by the pressure of the greater numbers in need
to do more. The correlation coefficients between the level of
poverty and level of utilization suggest a similar theme. Interest-
ingly enough, poor states show a positive relationship (.300) between
level of poverty and utilization, while rich states show a negative
one (-.269). It implies that within poor states, as the proportion
of poor increases, there are modest increases in those on assistance.
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In rich states, however, as the proportion of poor increases, the number
on assistance shows a slight decrease. As we shall see later, there
is apparently some trade-off between rate and benefit. Within poor
states, increasing levels of utilization is associate with lower
grants; within rich states, increasing utilization levels brings
higher grants.
20
It is not the case that poor states actually do more than
rich states. Their greater "response" is relative, and at a very
low level. Hence the greater poverty gap becomes an element of
pressure in the system, to which there must be some response, and
there is. But the response is actually quite inadequate.
Pressure and Adjustments
Pressure on the state welfare system comes, in one way, through
the number of people using welfare. It has increasingly come as well
through increased applications and thus increased welfare utilization.
There has been considerable speculation about the cause of the incre-
ments experienced during the 1960's. Some have argued that the poli-
tical pressure developed by the National Welfare Rights Organization
has been a potent factor. Others have seen loosening eligibility
through court decision and agency rule changes as key. Still others
have argued that better benefit levels themselves have made welfare
a better bargain, and induced people to leave whatever they were
doing and become a welfare recipient. Doubtless each, as well as
other factors are involved. However, two factors -- state climate
as represented by region, and the massive pressure on the program
as a result of the poverty gap seem of first order salience.
Relevant data are presented in Table 2, which shows the interrelation-
ships by region and state income of utilization and change.
Table 2 About Here
It is clear overall that the rate of increase in use of the AFDC
program between 1964 and 1969 was very heavy. Nationally, there was
a sixty percent increase, ranging from a low of 56 in the south to
a high of 80% in the northeast. Interestingly enough, the rate in
rich states was 207. higher than in poor states (69 to 51%).
These rates of increase are high, and one can easily see how,
taken independently of any sense of the location of the total program
in the system, they would be alarming. However, despite the magnitude
of these rates, the AFDC program meets only a small amount of the
potential demand. Significantly enough, that area with the greatest
poverty -- the south -- shows the second lowest rate of increase (56%)
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while the northeast and west, with relatively lower rates of poverty,
show relatively higher increments (80% and 62, respectively). It
appears that a poor person living in the south would do well to make the
investment (if he could) to travel north. These regional differences
make clear that the fight over residence requirements makes some
real differences to the state and potential users.
It should be remembered, however, that the large rate of increase
evidenced in the northeastern group would not bring its welfare rates
(See Table 1) up to that of the south, even if the south had had
no increments. In this sense, it is the west, with the second
lowest rate of poverty, the second highest rate of utilization and
the second highest rate of increment, which becomes the area doing
the relative most.
The correlation coefficients between increments and the level
of poverty and utilization are presented in Table 2 as well.
Nationally and regionally, there are only modest relationships
between utilization and increments. However, in the northeast and
west, change is positively related to utilization (.228 and .121)
while in the north central and south groups, the relationship is
negative (-.302 and -.258). One factor which the former state groups
have in common is relatively low poverty levels, suggesting that
perhaps wealthier state groups would be more tolerant of increments.
This notion is supported by the coefficients in the rich and poor
state groups. Within the rich states, there is a positive relationship
between use and increment (.460) while in the poor states the
relationship is negative (-.359). It may well be that poor states
have certain maxima which can't be exceeded for financial reasons.
Thus, in the poorer states, a higher level of utilization means that
there is little room for change and increase. In the rich states,
however, it could be that higher rates of use inspire more to use
welfare, something for which the richer states have a higher tolerance.
They may have as well a somewhat 2 reater willingness to "help out"
based upon a more adequate fisc.
This rate of change then, combined with the level of utilization,
creates a pressure on the public welfare system. It is important to
keep in mind though, that the weight of those increases, even at
levels which exceed 50M is simply a slight manifestation of an
immense latent pressure, which, to some extent, welfare administrators
had been dealing with all along. However, rates of use and change
are only one component of the situation. Another important part is
how much people receive.
Appropriations
The adequacy of the program depends not only upon how many people
are receiving some payment, but on the amount of the payment they
are receiving. And the payment, as we and others have suggested,
is related to the level of utilization and the degree of change.
Relevant data are presented in Table 3.
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Table 3 About Here
For the nation, in 1968, the average welfare appropriation, per
person, under the AFDC program was $37.00. There are, as expected,
important regional variations. Grants range from a high of $49.34
in the northeastern states to a low of $25.12 in the south. One
sees as well, the expected difference between rich and poor states.
Despite the similarity of rates, the grants in the poor states
average $29.49 as opposed to the grants in the wealthy states of $44.84.
The correlation coefficients are equally interesting. First,
there does appear to be a relationship, though in varying intensity,
between the grant and the degree of change. For the nation and the
sub-divisions represented here, there is a positive correlation
between these two variables. It ranges from a low of .044 in the
west to a high of .724 in the northeast. We should immediately note,
however, that the quick assumption that increased grants bring more
people into welfare deserves the closest scrutiny. Indeed, it appears
equally plausible that as more people apply and are accepted, more
needs present themselves, resulting in higher grants. It is doubtless
true, and wrong to deny, that a better benefit picture makes the
program more appealing; but we should not use this "common sense"
argument without thought, especially because the relationship between
appropriation and utilization present a somewhat different picture.
For the nation, and several of the subdivisions, the relation-
ships between utilization and appropriation are negative. It suggests
an inverse relationship between the level of use and the grant. Where
grants are lower, utilization rates would be higher. However, the
relationship is not quite this clear. While an inverse relationship
may characterize some areas, it does not characterize all. In regions
with the highest, and lowest grants, there is a positive relationship
between rates and grants. Using the rich and poor states as a basic
pattern (southern states merge into the poor states) higher levels
of utilization are positively related to grants for such states while
in poor states the reverse is true. Generally, one might think of
a situation in which the grant acts as a control in the rate of use.
However, in the more wealthy states, there is greater ability to
provide more adequately and hence, this control does not become
operational. Indeed, as welfare departments attempt to improve the
adequacy of their appropriations, this may well act to bring in sae
others, which may, over time, require the invocation of controls.
We come back once again to one of the central difficulties faced by
the assistance program -- it is so far from meeting needs that it
continually faces a qualitative-quantitative dilemma.
"Service"
One aspect of program quality, of course, is the adequacy of the
grant. Another one, and one much in dispute, is personal counseling
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service implicit in the use of a caseload administrative structure.
We cannot, of course, assess the quality of the interaction between
worker and client. However, using the assumption that the smaller
the caseload, the more helpful the worker is likely to be, we can
look at caseload levels. It would be appropriate to do this because
caseload is something of interest to the welfare professionals as
well. Relevant data are presented in Table 4.
Table 4 About Here
It should be understood, in considering the data of Table 4, that
Federal galidelines for rcimbursement require that a cas& load of 60
is necesary. Hence, the national average of 65 shows the influence
of this policy. And the range is only between 58 and 74. Further,
it is useful to remember that the correlations behave in the opposite
way than we are used to because the lower the caseload, the better
things supposedly are. Hence the negative signs in many of the numbers.
Looking at Table 4, several points become clear. First, there
is overall a "positive" relationship between appropriations and case-
load, between increasing clients and caseload, viz., as the appropriations
increase and the number of people serviced increases, the caseload
decreases.
What is also interesting is that the level of utilizations is
less clearly related to service than the previous variables. In four
cases, there is a positive (negative) relationship. In the remaining
three cases, caseloads increase as utilization increases. And finally,
the relationship between the level of poverty and the provision of
service is quite clear -- as poverty increases, so does caseload,
with the single exception of the north central state group.
The rich and poor states show an expected pattern. As the former
group provide higher grants, experience higher utilization and greater
increments, service improves. Poor states have a similar pattern
interrelationship to appropriations and change, but shift on utili-
zation and poverty levels, where service deteriorates as they increase.
In general, it seems reasonable to conclude that positive orienta-
tions toward the provision of service are related to positive orienta-
tions toward adequate funding, toiard greater tolerance for increased
use and higher levels of use. I f an area is positively disposed on
one, it is likely to be positively disposed on another at least up
to a point. Service, like the other variables in this respect, seems
negatively related to the level of poverty. This general group of
findings suggests that we should look at the ability and willingness
of the states to fund welfare programs.
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The Willingness and Ability of States
The concept of "willingness" and ability, however important,
are difficult to measure. As a beginning attempt, we have used three
measures -- the personal income per capita, 1968, state and local
taxes, per capita, 1967, and public assistance expenditures, amount per
$1000 personal income. Generally, it seems that the broadest measure
of ability would be the wealth of the state. Willingness could be
assessed by the amount that was actually expended, in relation to
income. However, intermediate between the ability and the willing-
ness measures is something which in a sense assesses both ability
and willingness -- taxes, measured here by state and local taxes,
per capita. In general, it seems that the first consideration in
the amount which the state makes available for welfare would be the
wealth of the state. The level of wealth, and the general willing-
ness of the state to tax itself for any and all purposes, provides
the pool of money from which the welfare money must come. 23 Given
the tax funds, public welfare interests, as other interests, must
compete for allocations. Data relevant to these considerations is
presented in Table 5. It becomes clear immediately that there are
important differences in the capacity of the states to provide money
for public welfare purposes.
Table 5 About Here
Indeed, the differences to us validate the initial separation of states
into rich and poor. In the rich states, the mean personal income per
capita is $3,697 while in the poor states it is $2,768. This
difference, of just under $1000 per capita, is a very great one, antd
certainly means that poor states are not just in a statistically
different group from rich ones, but have significantly less resources.
In terms of state and local taxes, the rich states show greater
willingness to pay more. State and local taxes are $334 per capita
in the rich states, and $155 in the poor ones. And there is the expected
difference in the amounts of welfare expenditures in relationship to
the wealth of the state. More is expended in rich states than in
poor ones. This simply suggests that rich states are not only more
able to spend money, but more willing. It may well be that the
greater ability is the cause of the greater willingness. It may also
be that in a situation of relatively greater security, petple are
inclined to be a little more "charitable." The correlational data
support this contention to a degree. The correlations between wealth
and taxation are considerably stronger for poor states than for rich,
which implies that poor states tax themselves relatively more than
rich ones, although less in dollar amount. However, the relationship
between tax and welfare monies is just the reverse. In that case,
the rich states exhibit a stronger relationship between tax and
welfare monies (.570) than poor states (.157). This suggests that rich
-273-
state ae relatively more willing to spend for welfare than poor
Ability and willingness, however, need to be translated into
actual welfare-tangible figures. Hence, we must look at these
variables in relationship to poverty in general and then to utilization,
change, appropriation and service. Relevant data is presented in
Table 6.
Table 6 About Here
Initially, it is clear that poverty is negatively related to both
ability and willingness. This finding is almost tautological, given
the definitions, but is not as absolute and complete as one might
have expected. For example, the level of poverty accounts for
approxisately 64 of the variance of per capita tax in poor states,
and 4 of the rich states. Yet the level of poverty has essentially
the same relationship and a very modest (though negative one) one
on expenditures.
The relationship of utilization to ability and willingness is
an interesting one. Nationally, there is essentially no relationship
between utilization and ability. Yet as we break it down it appears
that in rich states, ability and utilization is positively related
(.554) and in poor states, it is negatively related (-.428). It seems
that within wealthy states, as wealth increases, so does utilization.
However, within poor states, increments in wealth are related to
decreases in utilization. Given the fact that ther is a positive
relationship (.240) within the poor state group between public
assistance expenditures per capita and the average appropriation, it could
well be that poor states try to provide somewhat more money, at the
expense of greater scope. This interpretation is supported by the
correlations with change. Both ability and willingness have weaker
relations in poor states than in rich ones.
Perhaps the most clear-cut relations would be expected between
the fiscal indicators of ability and willingness at the state level
and the actual appropriations. And indeed, the correlations are
quite strong, as social science data go. Perhaps the interrelation-
ships between ability and willingness can begin to be understood by
inspecting the line of relationships between per capita income and
appropriations. Overall, the relationship nationally of .657 implies
that a reasonable relationship exists between state wealth and
appropriation. Looking at the rich and poor controls, however, it
seems that rich states have a weaker correlation than poor states (.125
vs. .516), suggesting that the wealth of a state is far less important
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in determining grant levels in rich than in poor. 25 These data
support the previous inference that the wealthier states go for broader
coverage, while the poorer states try to increase the grants (recalling
that wealthier states have higher grants anyway).
The willingness to tax seems to be a powerful variable in
relationship to appropriations, judging from the strength of the
relationships. In states with a high per capita income, the relation-
ship is lower than in the less fortunate states (.494 to .730). Again,
it implies that willingness counts more when the ability is low.
Discussion and Implications
The results seem to make clear that one of our original suspi-
cions, that studies of public welfare appropriations and utilization
require regional and contextual controls seems amply supported.
Even the apparently simple question of whether or not the program is
meeting "needs" becomes complicated. In the overall sense, there is
a clear gap between potential enrollees and the actual cases receiving
assistance. Yet within this context, poor states apparently are trying,
though inadequately, to respond. The difficulty lies in the fact that
the poorer the state, the greater the need, and the less the resources
with which to meet the need. The distinction between rich and poor
states, with the different welfare behavior they express, bears this
out. And it explains part of Kasper's finding, ghat relationships are
more clearcut in states with little assistance.
20
To us, one of the most salient factors in the research is the gap
between people receiving aid and those who potentially could use some
aid. The existence of this large gap has, we think,a host of implica-
tions for the welfare system, implications which are largely ignored
by other analysts.
First, it upsets the illusion that, because a program exists
to help alleviate poverty, it must come somewhere close to the goal.
As has been previously noted, we as a country simply have not come to
grips with the real extensivity of financial need. Hence, as we
think about the problem, we are surprised at extant levels of utiliza-
tion, annoyed at the level of appropriations, and aghast at large
increases in either. Automatically, we assume that people are leaving
the work force in droves, that there is widespread cheating, that
people are receiving too much money, and that social workers are "soft"
and"bleeding hearts." The fact that over twenty percent of American
families in 1959 were surely poor, and that this figure itself under-
represents the number of children in need, somehow never permeates.
And we have all been guilty of "under recognition." It seems most
appropriate, therefore, to consider appropriations, utilization and
change within a framework of great pressure and for practical purposes,
almost complete inadequacy. Welfare administrators simply do not have
the resources to deal with the problems of financial need in the context
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around them. The exact nature of this context, along such dimensions
as the extensiveness of need, the level of utilization to which the
state has become accustomed, the willingness and ability of the states
to provide welfare funds, may differ, and does differ. It is for that
reason that studies which consider the overall rate on a macroanalytic
basis become contradictory. For hypothetical purposes, let us present
an overall model of welfare operations which can perhaps account for
some of the variations and uncertainties.
We shall begin with the understanding that the basic element in
the welfare system is the money which the state has to use. The
sources of welfare monies are three -- federal, state, and in some
general assistance programs, local. And for purposes, here, the
sources are only state and federal. There are different calculi
involved in each of the funding sources. The basic element is that
the federal monies come on a case supplement basis, with a limit per
case but theoretically no total dollar limit. State money is part
of the total state budget, passed upon by the legislature.
Based upon some estimates of "need" the state welfare department
will submit its requests to the legislature, along with the other
departments in the state. At this point, several considerations
external to welfare enter. Welfare appropriations must compete with
other programs for a limited amount of state dollars. In poor states,
the problem of competition becomes especially acute, and even more
serious because the poor do not have representatives in the state
capitols lobbying for their interests. 27 Further, our general ideo-
logy about the poor means that welfare administrators would be unlikely
to ask for an amount which would have adequacy and extensivity. There
is a sort of subjective limit to budget increases which is difficult
to surmount, and this general hesitance only augments a specific
hesitancy insofar as the welfare program is concerned. After some
wrangling, a budget is accepted. Generally, it is what the delrt-
ment received the previous year, plus or minus a small amount. This
appropriation is surely less than would meet need. But this is the
money available, and this is the money with which the administrator
mst work.
One very important feature of the state allocation is that it
appears relatively inelastic, viz., that there is relatively great
difficulty in getting additional appropriations if the money runs out.
There is no way other than calling a special session of the legislature.
Invoking an extraordinary session of the appropriations machinery is a
risky business under the best of circumstances. To do so for a group
which is unpopular simply opens the whole situation up to "flack" at
best, and could result (and has in punitive changes in the program
aspects governed by the state.2 ' For most practical purposes, then,
the fiscal inelasticity means that the state department of welfare
has to live within, or very close to, the budget approved by the
legislature. This in turn means that the state budget is an effective
parameter on state welfare spending. Given the set amount of money,
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the state department can give more people less or fewer people more.
If it gives more people more dollars and begins to run out, then
it's in trouble.
The fiscal inelasticity, however, would not be a serious problem
if the program were closely articulated to the need for its services.
In that case, there would be small overruns which could probably be
handled by the state departments of social services without much
trouble. However, the situation with public welfare is exactly the
opposite. We have shown that there is a serious chasm between those
people helped by the program, and those who might be potential enrollees
of the program. Certainly, there are important proportions of people
who could be on welfare, but who, at any given moment in time are
somehow "making out" without applying. This group constitutes a
direct pressure on the organization (See Table 1). Then there is a
larger proportion who at any given moment in time may not be eligible,
but who, depending upon even slight changes in their personal and
social circumstances, could well become eligible. Both these groups
are very elastic. Hence, the elasticity of the "demand" or "need"
is great, depending upon a variety of factors which the departments
of social services cannot control. This is suggested by Table 2
which shows rather modest correlations between prior use and change.
We thus have a situation where, depending on economic conditions,
the presence of a strike, a spell of inclement weather, or whatever,
can bring a number of additional people to the doors of the public
welfare office making application for welfare benefits.
One further problem needs noting. Welfare administrators and
professionals, like other people running programs, constantly seek
to improve their program. One type of improvement in the program
is to make the grants higher, and to cover more needs in existing
grants. However, as this is done it is likely to make the program
more attractive, and hence, draw more people from "making out" status
onto the roles. This is perhaps one of the reasons for the positive
correlations between change and appropriation, relationships which
are higher than between change and utilization. It does seem that
states try to respond, though poor states do so more inadequately.
This can explain in part the bitter truculance which often erupts
when clients and state fiscal officers get together. The clients
point to the real, palapable inadequacies of the program, in both
adequate and coverage terms. Officers of the state point to the
degree of responses in both these terms which has been made, and to
the limitations of the state fisc. Both are right. Across the
board, intrastate increments in appropriations and increments in
enrollees (change) are positively correlated (Table 3). It is true
as well (Table 2) that the relationships between intrastate increments
(change) and poverty are all negative. In sum, then, the department
of social services operates in a situation defined by minimum to
low elasticity on the fiscal ("supply") side, and medium to high
elasticity on the need ("demand") side. Attempts to make the
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program more fiscally adequate for the recipients means that such
increases in supply as the administrators can negotiate will make
the program more attractive to nonenrollees, increasing applicant
rates, and putting stress on the ability of the program to meet demand
at the new, higher level. Negotiating these troubled waters is one
of the main jobs of state welfare administrators and their county
counterparts.
Several options are available to welfare personnel in dealing
with the complex situation of differential elasticity which we have
been discussing. One pattern we observe is an inverse relationship
between the rate of use (between states) and the grant. This obtains
in northcentral states and in western states, and in low income
states, and, in a mild way, for the nation as a whole (Table 3).
This is the difficult choice between helping more people with fewer
dollars, or fewer people with more dollars. Steiner comments
To put it another way, states may either stretch a fixed state
appropriation to cover whatever number of catagorical assistance
applicants are found eligible.... But this does not assure
payment to the client of a fixed amount because state funds
may be finite and states may therefore pay clients less than
fully budgeted need. States may not establish waiting lists
in public assistance, but they may divide their money into
smaller shares for more people.3 0
Another alternative, of course, is to seek more money. Success
here depends on the ability and willingness of the state to provide
more money, and there is some evidence from the tables that the more
wealthy the state is, the more likely it is to be able and willing to
increase coverage and benefits. However, there are, we are sure, maxima
here which even wealthy states will not exceed. Especially as economic
conditions cause higher prices and lower tax revenues, competition
for the tax dollar will increase. If historical examples are followed,
welfare is almost surely one of the first to endure "economies.iv
J l
This is virtually certain to be true when the "effect" of program-
matic improvements is to create increments in the number of people
using welfare, or the number of people using welfare brings forth new
needs. This appears to be the case in high income states. Those
states which have higher appropriations have higher use. However,
it should also be noted that there are positive relationships between
utilization and appropriation in the south and the northeast, the
poorest and richest segments of the country, respectively. It suggests
that the relationship between appropriations and utilization is cur-
valiniar. In poor states with high poverty and low benefits, needs
are great, and increments in utilization and grants are positively
related. Increments in appropriation are not great. In the northeast
which is the wealthiest area and spends the most for welfare, incre-
ments also bring more people onto the roles. In one case, greater
pressure operates; in the other, greater willingness. So for diffe-
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rent reasons, the poorest and the richest attempt to secure more money,
while those in the middle effect some kind of "trade-off" between
grants and appropriations.
Summary and Conclusions
One point should now be clear, viz., that easy answers to the
question of "response to need" will simply not be forthcoming. The
programs of welfare assistance in this country, which operate through
the state and county welfare departments, (and these do not include
all "welfare" programs by any means), attempt to meet need insofar
as they can respond to it. However, the picture is a complex one,
and must begin with an understanding of the great gap between program
enrollees and potential needy. Within this context, it appears that
attempts are made, within the state itself (and county), to balance
needs, resources, adequacy, extensivity into a sort of continuing
calculus. Hypothetically it appears this calculus is one of nego-
tiating between inelastic fiscal support and an elastic need for
welfare aid.
In developing the final picture for any state, the ability and
willingness of the state to provide welfare benefits seems to be a
factor. In general, states with relatively lower poverty levels and
higher incomes have a greater willingness to provide benefits, which
in turn results in more adequate coverage and greater rates of increase.
It is probably better to be poor in a rich state than in a poor one.
In any case, it is the complexity of the interrelationships,
rather than their simplicity that is impressive. It is clear that
one program alone does not provide sufficient data -- we must ulti-
mately consider all the programs -- federally aided and general assistance
as well as such federal programs as housing, veterans benefits, etc.
We can expect to find interprogram adjustments as the states try to
balance out help to the various categories of eligibles. Our early
thought that direct relationships between macro economic and social
indicators and simple rates ignored the transactional activities of
the welfare department seems to be borne out, and points to intensive
study of the local welfare unit as a key element in much of the
welfare process.
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FOOTNOTES
1. For one good study, see (Steiner, 1966).
2. Dawson and Robinson (1965:371-410); Gordon (1969:64-88);
Collins (1967:97-173); Kasper (1968:86-110).
3. Dawson and Robinson (1965:402).
4. Gordon (1969:83).
5. Indeed, this old fear prompted the principle of "less eligibility"
in Europe and England. In the words of Baron von Vought, of
Hamburg, Germany, written in 1776, "It was our determined principle
to reduce this support lower than what any industrious man or
woman in such circumstances could earn; for if the manner in which
relief is given is not a spur to industry, it becomes undoubtedly
a premium to sloth and profligacy..." in Karl de Schweinitz,
England's Road to Social Security (New York: Barnes & Nobel, 1961),
92. In 1968, Kasper speculates that "Perhaps one result of
receiving welfare assistance for a long period of time (or living
in a neighborhood with many welfare recipients) is an increased
preference for leisure relative to work." Kasper (1968:87, fn.
2 & Table 5:156).
6. Collins (1967:126 Table 6); Dawson & Robinson (1968:404 Table 10).
7. Collins (1967:126 Table 6); Dawson & Robinson (1968:402 Table 9).
8. Kasper (1968:109).
9. Kasper (1968:94). He uses a dummy variable, 1 - eastern and
northern states; 0 = rest.
10. Kasper (1968:109). Klatzky (1970) looks specifically at the level
of wealth of a state as a basis for differentiation of functions
between state employment agencies. And Presthus (1964) notes
differences in the stratification structure of a community relates
to its ability to mobilize resources.
11. Dawson & Robinson, (1968:402 Table 9).
12. This is the usual case, although there are some states which have
the federal programs separate from the General Assistance Program,
etc.
13. For example, Banfield comments: "And by keeping the effective
demand for benefits within manageable bounds, it (the welfare
bureaucracy) could also make feasible higher payment levels than
could otherwise be allowed without swamping the system." He adds
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in a footnote "...that generosity." Banfield (1969:100).
14. A study is underway which has distributed extensive questionnaires
to a national sample of county welfare directors. As the results
become available, we will have a better understanding of this
"transactional organization". For some study of these areas, see
Sarri, et. al. (1970). Also, see Rosemary Sarri, Wolfgang
Grichting and John E. Tropman, "Client Careers in State Departments
of Social Welfare" unclassified report, Social and Rehabilitation
Service, Department of Health, Education and Welfare (March 1969).
15. Kasper (196894). In our judgement he misses the significance of
this point, however.
16. In a larger study, the author has welfare rates for all five
programs for a sample of 350 counties within the United States.
The research is currently in process. And looking at the inter-
correlation matrix of the five programs for all counties, 1969,
shows that the rates of utilization are positively correlated.
Hence, one indicator program can be selected with a somewhat
greater feeling of confidence. See, Sarri, et. al. (1970:167
Table 3:11), and Tropman (1974, 1975).
17. High states are: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Washington, D.C., Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Washington, Wisconsin.
Low states are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming.
18. This figure has some "two adult" families, which would be
ineligible but would tend to underreport families with large
numbers of children who would be eligible.
19. Using the suggested figures by Mollie Orshansky (viz., $3,000 for
a family of 4) 38.9 million persons (22.1% of the population) were
in poverty in 1959. By 1966, this figure dropped to 15.4 which
still constitutes a formidable pressure on the public aid system.
Encyclopedia of Social Work, (1970) Table 16, p. 1580.
20. See Table 3.
21. Also, they tend to be the states with higher costs of living.
22. That is, that rich states may be more willing and able to tolerate
higher grants than poor states, but they are not without any limit
at all.
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23. Welfare money, of course, comes from the state and the federal
government. However, the federal supplement comes on a per
case basis, and hence, the basic calculus is determined by the
amount of money the state provides.
24. Phillip Booth notes that the contrast between the condition of
poor and rich is more visible and more extreme in rich, rather
than poor states, leading perhaps to more public support.
25. The different marginal matching ratios between Federal and
State grants may have an impact here.
26. Kasper (1968:94).
27. There may be a "pecking order" for programs as well, with certain
ones, education for example, having first priority.
28. See, Wildavsky (1964).
29. One special device favored by state legislatures is the ceiling
or upper limit on a grant for one or another program.
30. Steiner (1971), p. 23.
31. The actual budget may not be cut, but it may have to service
more people. One first step legislators often take is to redefine
need. Several states (New York, for example), have reinstituted
residency requirements.
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